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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUGARHOUSE FINANCE COMPANY, ) 
) 
-vs-
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
) Case No. 16462 
EUGENE L. ANDERSON and 
COLLEEN W. AL'IDERSON, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents.) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the validity and effect of a settlement 
agreement entered into by the parties on January 31, 1979. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court held that the settlement agreement was 
binding on the parties and entered its Order requiring the plaintiff 
to carry out and complete the terms of that settlement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the District Court's ruling 
that the settlement agreement was valid and enforceable between the 
parties. In the alternative, appellant seeks a new trial in this 
action. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Based upon the failure of defendants to answer plaintiff's 
Interrogatories, the District Court of Salt Lake County entered judgment 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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against the defendants on December 17, 1976, in the sum of $2,4); 
plus interest, attorney's fees and court costs. (R.22-3, 58) A 
major portion of that judgment remained unpaid in January, 1979 .. 
58' 95} 
On January 29, 1979, the defendants were served at the;:
1 
in Salina, Utah, with a Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedi: 
requiring them to appear before the court in Salt Lake County on, 
February 20, 1979. (R.58, 95) Two days later, on January 31, l~ 
defendant E;ugene L. Anderson traveled to Salt Lake City to meet·,:: 
Mr. Newman C. Petty, the owner and presiding officer of the plaid 
finance company, concerning the amount due on the judgment. His 
purpose was to try to settle and satisfy the amount due and owin1 
the plaintiff on the judgment. (R. 38, 58, 95, 114) 
Because of a serious automobile accident that occurred. 
April, 1978, defendants were in dire financial difficulty at the: 
of that visit. Mr. Anderson had been hospitalized for one month, 
he had been unable to work at his service station for an addition: 
month because of the injuries he received in the accident. (R.l~ 
His unpaid medical bills amounted to over $9, 000. 00, and his add;: 
obligations exceeded $30,000.00 at that time. (R.101-103) 
Anderson told Petty about his accident and about his i~ 
cial difficulties when he met with him at his office in Salt Lah 
City to discuss the obligation. (_R. 95-6) Anderson had never ha; 
other judgments against him, and he wanted to get this one settli 
(R.113) 
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After some discussion about Anderson's ability to pay the 
amount due, including comments about possible bankruptcy, the part-
ies reached a settlement agreement. Under its terms, plaintiff agreed 
to accept the sum of $2,200.00 in full payment and satisfaction of the 
the existing judgment. (R.38, 59, 96, 115) 
Anderson then made and delivered his check in the sum of 
$2,200.00 to Mr. Petty in full payment of the settlement amount. The 
check was drawn on Zion's First National Bank, Salina, Utah, and the 
purpose of payment was stated on the check in the following language: 
"Payment in full judgment civil ffo 236207." (Exhibit 1, R. 38, 59, 96) 
Anderson requested that Petty retain the check for two days 
while he made arrangements for the check to clear the bank. (R.59,97, 
115) After those arrangements had been completed, Anderson called 
Petty to tell him the check would clear. (R.59, 104-106) At the 
time of that call, Petty notified Anderson that he had decided not 
to accept the settlement and that he would return the check by mail. 
(R.39, 59, 100) Anderson received the check in Salina the following 
day. (R.39., 100) 
Mr. Petty revoked the settlement agreement when he learned 
that Anderson had some money coming from the sale of some real 
property in Salina, Utah. (R.116-117) Mr. Anderson had made arrange-
ments to sell two acres of property in association with a co-owner, 
but he was to receive only $2,000.00 from the transaction. That amount 
was to be used to pay some of the many bills he owed at that time. 
(R.107-8, 116) 
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Thereafter, the defendants filed their Motion for an~ 
I 
requiring the plaintiff to carry out and complete the terms of n, 
settlement referred to above. (R. 40) The Affidavit of Eugene L. 
Anderson was filed in support of that Motion. (R.38-9) Hearing.; 
the Motion was first set for Thursday, February 15, 1979, but was 
continued on stipulation of the parties to March 13, 1979. Based 
upon the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties at. 
the hearing, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusiot 
of Law and then ordered that defendants' Motion· should be granted 
The Order also required that defendants immediately pay the plaint~ 
the sum of $2, 200. 00 in the form of a Cashier's Check to represen:I 
full settlement and satisfaction of the judgment previously entere\• 
the court. Plaintiff was required by the Order to enter Sa tis fact 
of Judgment when payment was received. The Findings and the Order! 
were signed on April 13, 1979. (R.58,61) 
The Cashier's Check was delivered to the office of p~~ 
tiff's counsel on March 16, 1979, and he retained possession of thl 
check for a period of 54 days before returning to defendants' ~ounl 
on May 9, 1979. (R. 71-2) Upon motion of the plaintiff, the Findi~ 
I 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were amended by the court on June ii 
1979. (R. 89~92) [ 
Notice of Appeal was timely filed, and plaintiff asks t:I 
Supreme Court for relief from the legal effect of the settlement 
agreement. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 5 -
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTERED 
INTO BY THE PARTIES WAS SUPPORTED 
BY ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION 
The trial court found that the agreement formulated by the 
parties on January 3, 1979, was based upon an adequate con~ideraton. 
(R.91) Appellant asserts on this appeal that the evidence adduced at 
the hearing on respondents' Motion to require appellant to carry out 
and complete the terms of the settlement does not support that finding. 
On this basis, appellant seeks reversal of the Order entered by the 
District Court. 
The general common-law rule pertaining to accord and satis-
faction provides that an agreement by a creditor to accept part payment 
of a liquidated debt as payment in full does not discharge the whole 
debt unless it is supported by a new and additional consideration. 
FMA Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17 U.2d 80, 404 P.2d 670(1965). 
The Utah court has recognized that rigid application of this 
rule can occasionally result in great inequity, In the FMA case, the 
court noted that the modern trend in the courts is to find a consider-
ation somewhere in the new arrangement between the parties, The lang-
uage of the court, found on page 673, recognizes that the courts now 
follow the more equitable result in such cases: 
"It is true that the modern trend is to be cautious about 
rigidly applying this rule and that courts are generally 
somewhat indulgent toward finding consideration somewhere 
in the new arrangement, such as that it was to settl~ a 
dispute, or that there is some advantage to the cr~ditor 
in accepting the lesser amount, where the unreasoning 
adherence to the rule might result in inequity." Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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In another case, the Utah court has recognized that th 
e:I 
be varying circumstances in which the debtor is induced by the re\i 
of the creditor to make payment in some manner other than he is ot.. 
gated to do, If he is so induced, and if he suffers some legal de· 
1 
ment in making the payment, there is consideration for the promise, 
the debt is discharged. See Tates v. Little American Refining CoQ 
535 P,2d 1228(1975). In 1 Am Jur 2d, Accord and Satisfaction, rn 
p,311, the author states that the general rule is not looked ~00 ~ 
favor by the court and that the application of exceptions to this :
1 
have been more numerous than those of the rule itself, the court;:/ 
ing upon slight circumstances to take the cases away from the operl 
of the rule. In §35, the author states that the rule has been muc: 
criticized and condenmed and many exceptions have been made to avo: 
the injustice and inequity that frequently result from strict enfo·1 
ment of the rule, Referring to the requirement of additional com:. 
I ation, the author gives the following explanation: 
"Whether or not the basis of the rule as it was originally I 
adopted was lack of consideration, it is evident that the 
theory of the rule as it obtains at the present time is one 
of consideration for the discharge of the residue of the I 
debt, and if some consideration which is new or collateral . 
to the partial payment enters into the agreement, it will, ' 
when executed, be upheld as good accord and satisfaction. I 
The collateral or additional consideration may consist of I 
anything which would be a burden or inconvenience to the. one ! 
party or a possible benefit to the other, the fact that it ! 
is significant or technical being innnaterial," 
Some of the courts have even allowed the insolvency of c 
debtor to act as sufficent consideration to uphold the new agreeme: 
In 1 Am Jur 2d, Accord and Satisfac'l to accept the lesser amount. 
' I 
.l 
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§38, p.337, the author discusses the effect of insolvency of the 
debtor as follows: 
"Where the debtor is known to the creditor to be insolvent 
and the creditor, in consideration of such fact, agrees to' 
and does accept part payment of a liquidated demand (at 
least one which is dischargable in bankruptcy) in full satis-
faction, the courts generally hold that the rule that a 
liquidated and matured debt is not discharged by the payment 
and acceptance of a less sum in satisfaction is not applicable, 
and the transaction will be upheld as a good accord and 
satisfaction, even though it is subsequently proven that the 
debtor was not insolvent." 
In an older annotation found in 96 ALR 1133 pertaining to 
the general rule, the author discusses the adequacy of consideration 
for a promise to accept less than the full amount in full payment as 
follows: 
".,.,However, it is well settled that if there is any 
benefit to the creditor, or detriment to the debtor, result-
ing from the new contract, a consideration sufficient to 
support it exists." 
In the case now before the court, there was sufficient con-
sideration to support the promise of the appellant to accept a lesser 
amount in p~yment of the judgment pending against the respondents. 
Unrefuted evidence shows that Eugene L. Anderson was injured in an 
accident on April 13, 1978, which required that he be hospitalized 
for a long period of time. In addition, he was away from his busines-
for an additional period of time after he was released from the hospital 
To make matters worse, his service station business was not doing well. 
He had been unable to support his family during the previous year, and 
his obligations were well over $30,000.00, in addition to the medical 
expenses resulting from the accident. (R.101-103) 
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In order to obtain the funds needed to pay the settleme 
amount, Anderson told Petty that he would arrange for a loan at t 
local bank. These arrangements were completed so that immediate 
ment of the settlement amount could be made. 
The original judgment had been entered by the court on 
December 17, 1976. In the previous two years, the appellant had 
with little success in collecting the amount of the judgment. Th 
settlement agreement between the parties provided for immediatep 
ment of a substantial amount of that judgment. The appellant was 
thereby relieved of further efforts to collect the amount due. S 
mental, Garnishment and Execution proceedings were no longer nece 
and appe11·ant could close its books on this account and direct it 
efforts to collection of other pending judgments and accounts. T 
respondents, on the other hand, had to look forward to the paymen 
the loan, including any interest connected therewith, as a substi 
to the satisfied judgment. The settlement agreement formulatedb 
the parties in this instance invo 1 ved the advantage of immediate 
ment to the plaintiff'and the disadvantage of loan arrangements t 
defendants. Under both the letter and the spirit of the modern t 
recognized by the Utah court in the case of FMA Financial Corpora 
Build, Inc., supra, there was sufficient and adequate considerati 
support the agreement of the parties for accord and satisfaction 
the judgment pending in this action. 
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Appellant relies primarily on the case of Ralph A. Badger 
and Company v. Fidelity Building and Loan Association, 94 U 97, 75 p. 2d 
669(1968) in support of its position in this case. Respondents do not 
disagree with the principles laid down in that case, but they hasten 
to point out that the case turned more on the fraud of the defendant 
than on lack of consideration. The defendant building and loan associa-
tion had adopted a policy under which it had ceased to accept and pay 
amounts owing on stock withdrawals and had used its income for other 
purposes. When plaintiff presented his stock certificate for payment, 
he was fraudulently informed that it was not yet due and payable and 
that other certificates having an aggregate value of $50,000.00 had to 
be paid ahead of his. These representations were clearly false. The 
plaintiff then sold the certificate for one-half of its true value to 
a third party who turned out to be an agent of the defendant who was 
using defendant's money to buy the certificates at the discounted rate. 
The entire arrangement was designed to purchase the stock withdrawals 
at less than their face values. The defendant was guilty of serious 
fraud, and the court emphasized the facts relating thereto. 
The circumstances of this case show sufficient consideration 
to support the parties' settlement agreement. The adverse financial 
situation of the defendants and their need to obtain a loan to pay off 
the settlement amount was adequate consideration to support their side 
of the settlement agreement. On the other hand, the promise of an 
immediate return to the plaintiff gave sufficient benefit to make the 
agreement of the parties binding and enforceable. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 10 -
POINT NO. II 
DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF NO FRAUD, 
MISREPRESENTATION OR DECEIT IN 
PROCURRING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
There is no evidence in the record to support appellant': 
contention that the settlement agreement between the parties was 
tained by fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. 
Newman Petty testified that he rescinded the settlement 
agreement because he received a telephone call from a title company 
advising him that Mr. Anderson was attempting to sell some real 
property in Salina, Utah. (_R.116) Anderson admitted that he had 
arranged for the sale of certain real property in concert with its 
co-owner, Mr. Keith Cannon, but he further testified that the total 
amount that he would realize from the sale was in the sum of $2,00~. 
He was intending to use that amount to pay off some of the other o 
that he owed. (_R.107-8) The sum expected from the sale was not 
sufficient to change the circumstances of the defendants when the 
meeting with Mr. Petty was held, They were still in dire financia 
straits, having at least $39, 000. 00 pending in outstanding obligat 
The small amount to be received at the sale was earmarked to hold 1 
other creditors who were threatening to take court action against 
Andersons. Those funds had apparently been pledged to cover other 
debts because Anderson still was required to obtain a loan to pay 
the amount promised to the Sugarhouse Finance Company. The amount 
realized from the sale probably made it possible for Anderson to 0 
the loan needed to satisfy the judgment. 
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Appellant contends in its brief on appeal that defendnat 
Eugene Anderson testified that he had no assets whatsoever. A careful 
review of the evidence about the meeting of the parties reveals no 
testimony to this effect, Both of the parties testified that Mr, 
Anderson discussed his dire financial circumstances. Anyone familiar 
with bankruptcy proceedings must recognize that even persons who are 
adjudged to be insolvent may nevertheless possess numerous assets. In 
this instance, the problem was created by the large number of obliga-
tions that had accumulated because of the accident of Mr. Anderson 
and the decrease in income from his business. The record reveals no 
statements about the lack of assets on the part of the defendants. 
It is elementary under Utah law that allegations of fraud 
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and will not lie in 
mere suspicion or inuendo. See Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of 
America, 405 P.2d 339, 17 U.2d 114, 14 ALR 3rd 1058, The question as 
to whether Eugene Anderson had dealt fraudulently with the plaintiff 
was an issue of fact that was resolved by the court after hearing the 
evidence adduced at the hearing on defendants' Motion, Although the 
court found that Mr. Anderson was anticipating the sale of certain real 
property in Sevier County when he went to see Mr, Petty, the court 
also found that his actions were not fraudulent in any way, In other 
words, the plaintiff failed to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that Mr. Anderson defrauded the plaintiff, 
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The decision of the fact finder must stand unless the de 
sion was clearly erroneous. The Utah Supreme Court has held that. 
an action at law the question on appeal is not whether the evidenci 
would have supported a judgment in favor of the appellant, but whe: 
the judgment entered by the trial court finds support in the evide[ 
Green v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S., 284 p .2d oi 
3 U. 2d 3 7 5. The Supreme Court will not disturb the findings of fa 
of the lower court when the evidence, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the winning party, is sufficient to sustain such find: 
See Gibbons & Reed Company v. Guthrie, 256 P.2d 706, 123 U 172. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that if there is''· 
stantial evidence to support a judgment of the court below in an a1 
at law, the Supreme Court will affirm. Leon Glazier & Sons Inc. ·1. 
Larsen, 491 P. 2d 226, 26 U. 2d 429. The Supreme Court review in lo 
cases is limited to the determination of whether or not there is 
competent evidence to support the judgment of the trial court. Dat 
v. George Romney & Sons Company, 184 P.2d 211, 111 U 471. 
The evidence pertaining to the question of fraud, when v: 
in a light most favorable to the respondents, is clearly sufficien! 
support the judgment of the District Court. The amount to be rece:; 
from the sale of property was only a drop in the bucket when compa:: 
with the impending obligations of the Anderson family. The failur< 
reveal the facts surrounding the sale of that propery made no difi:' 
whatsoever to the settlement agreement, and would not have affect<: 
outcome of the negotiations between the parties, 
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The evidence pertaining to the question of consideration, 
when viewed in a light most favorable to the respondents, is also 
sufficient to support the judgment of the District Court It is 
undisputed that the defendants were in dire financial circumstances 
at the time of the settlement agreement, and no one questions the 
Anderson testimony that it was necessary for him to obtain an loan to 
pay the settlement amount. The court can take judicial notice of the 
fact that no further collection efforts would be necessary once the 
settlement amount was paid, The evidence is sufficient to support 
the Order of the court, and that decision should be upheld by this 
court on appeal. 
POINT NO, III 
APPELLANT HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO 
CONDUCT DISCOVERY PROCEEDINGS PRIOR 
TO THE HEARING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION. 
The appellant claims on this appeal that it was afforded no 
opportunity for discovery work prior to the hearing on the Motion filed 
by the respondents. The record shows no attempt by the plaintiff to 
initiate any discovery procedures prior to the hearing on March 13, 
1979. When the hearing convened, counsel for appellant objected to 
further proceedings on the ground that he had not had opportunity to 
complete his discovery work. Of course, this objection was overruled. 
The record shows that respondents' Motion was filed on 
February 8, 1979. Hearing was first scheduled on February 15, 1979, 
but was continued upon stipulation of the parties until March 13, 1979. 
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A period of 33 days passed between the filing of the Motion and tt 
hearing held by the court. The Motion was supported by the Affida 
of defendant Eugene L. Anderson, and his contentions were clearly 
fore the court and the appellant at that time, Any necessary disc, 
work by the appellant was ignored until the time of the hearing. 
Interrogatories were filed, no Depositions were scheduled, no Requ, 
for Admissions were made, and no other steps were taken to carry 01 
the discovery proceedings available to the appellant under the Utai 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The courts have always required the parties to act with 
dispatch and diligence in litigation matters. The party desiring 
take advantage of the ·discovery procedures must take the initiativ1 
to go forward with the preparation of his case. Arrangements for 
preparation lie in the hands of counsel and not in the hands of thi 
court. It is noteworthy that the appellant didn't even subpoena an 
witnesses to the hearing, The only witness called to testify on 
appellant's behalf was defendant Eugene L, Anderson, who was calle1 
for cross-examination purposes only, The problems related to lack 
discovery in the matter now before the court were caused by the la 
of diligence on the part of the appellant and not because of any e~ 
on the part of the court, 
POINT NO, IV 
DEFENDANTS FOLLOWED PROPER 
PLEADING PROCEDURE IN 
CONNECTION WITH THIS ACTION. 
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Appellant complains in its Brief that defendants' Motion 
for an Order requiring the plaintiff to carry out and complete the 
terms of a settlement entered into by the parties on January 31, 1979, 
did not comply with established pleading procedure because it was not 
made pursuant to any rule or statute. This contention has no merit 
because the Motion conforms to the provisions of Rule 60, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Paragraph (b) of that Rule provides, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
"On mot ion and upcn such term as are just, the court may in 
the futherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons , . , (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, . . . or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective applica-
tions; , . , The procedure for obtaining any rel i e f from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these Rules or 
by an independent action," 
The above Rule defines the procedure that must be followed in 
cases like the one before the court, The Motion was proper, and the 
court had adequate jurisdiction to proceed with the resolution of the 
problem raised by the parties, 
CONCLUSION 
For reasons set forth above, the decision and Order of the 
District Court requiring the plaintiff to complete and carry out the 
settlement agreement should be affirmed, 
DATED this 23rd day of October, 1979. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
,___---'; /) ,' :f ~ _),,,... 
/ ~. f~~~\./L---Z~ n-~-
H. RALPH KL 
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NOTICE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing Brief on Appeal was served upon the appelL 
by mailing two copies thereof to its attorneys, Moyle & Draper, 6~! 
Deseret Plaza, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, by United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, this 24th day of October, 1979. 
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